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COMMENT:
REVISITING CONGRESS' NEW IDEA IN SPECIAL
EDUCATION

Dixie Snow Huefner·
I write in response to Christopher Dean Greenwood's
article, "Congress' New IDEA in Special Education," appearing
in the inaugural issue of BYU's Journal of Law and
Education. 1 Although the author raises a legitimate question
as to whether some of the costs associated with Part B of the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA-B) are
unduly burdensome to the public education system, the article
itself does not illuminate the answer. Because the author
misreports and apparently misunderstands some of the
statutory requirements, his thesis is undermined.
My intent in this comment is to place Part B of the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act in a broader
context than does Greenwood and to illuminate why his
arguments are inadequate. I begin with a description setting
forth the basic components of the statute-by way of expansion
and clarification of Greenwood's brief overview. I then address
the major problems with his article, as I see them.
l. STATUTORY BACKGROUND

Originally enacted in 1975 as Public Law 94-142 (the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act), 2 IDEA-B
requires states accepting federal funds under the statute to
assure that a "free appropriate public education" is available to
eligible students with disabilities. 3 As Greenwood notes, at the
time of its passage many states continued to engage in a longstanding pattern of excluding students with disabilities,
particularly intellectual and emotional disabilities, from the
public school system. This discriminatory exclusion was in spite
of the fact that these children were educable and in need of

M.S., J.D., Assistant Professor, Department of Special Education, University
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah.
1.
B.Y.U. L. and Educ. J., Spring 1992, 49-73 (formerly B.Y.U. J.L. and

Educ.).
2.
P.L. 94-142 was Part B of the more-encompassing Education of the
Handicapped Act (EHA). The 1990 Amendments to EHA renamed the entire
statute the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. It is Part B that was the
subject of Greenwood's article and is the subject of this Comment.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(B).
3.
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education services. 4 The statute is a remedial statute, intended
to bring unserved or underserved students fully into the
education system and to help states pay for the added costs of
educating them. 5 It is a money grant to states conditioned on
state acceptance of federal standards. In case the reader was
confused, Greenwood's various references to the Education of
the Handicapped Act, the Education for all Handicapped
Children Act, and the IDEA are to the same basic special
education statute, as amended over time. The regulations
implementing the statute flesh out the standards for receipt of
the federal money and are mandates, not "guidelines" as
Greenwood frequently refers to them.
IDEA-B requires school districts to locate and identify
all children within their jurisdiction who may be eligible for
special education. 6 The federal regulations require that, prior
to receipt of special education services, a student must receive
a multidisciplinary evaluation for eligibility. 7 Eligible students
must receive specially designed instruction directed by an
individualized education program (IEP) that is meant to be
developed and written jointly by school professionals and the
parents. 8 The instruction and related services needed for these
students to benefit from special education must be delivered "to
the maximum extent appropriate" in settings with students
who are not disabled. 9 Where appropriate education cannot be
accomplished in a "mainstream" (regular school or regular
class) setting, it may be provided in a segregated setting. 10

4.
For background information about the educability of the children with
disabilities who were being excluded from the public schools, see the landmark
cases of Mills v. Board of Educ. of the Dist. of Columbia, 349 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C.
1972) and PARC v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
5.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b)(c).
6.
20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(C).
7.
34 C.F.R. §300.532.
8.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(20); 34 C.F.R. § 300.344 and Appendix C.
9.
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5).
10.
See 34 C.F.R. § 300.550-552.
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To protect students with disabilities 11 from arbitrary and
ill-conceived school decision-making, parents are given a
number of procedural rights to exercise on behalf of their
children. Among them are the right to notification, written
consent prior to initial evaluation and initial placement, access
to their child's educational records, an independent educational
evaluation under certain circumstances, participation in the
development of the IEP, and the right to a hearing to contest
proposed school actions with respect to identification,
evaluation, placement, and delivery of a free appropriate public
education. 12 Only when these procedural rights have failed to
protect a child's educational rights will the due process hearing
of which Greenwood speaks come into play.

II.

GREENWOOD'S ARGUMENTS

Greenwood's major thesis seems to be that 1986 and 1990
amendments to IDEA-B, or judicial interpretation of them,
have unduly burdened the public school system by: ( 1)
increasing the numbers of students served and the difficulty of
identifying them, (2) allowing injudicious awards of attorneys'
fees to parents, (3) allowing awards of "monetary damages"
against school districts failing to provide students with the
mandated free appropriate public education, and (4) removing
state immunity from suit. A secondary thesis appears to be
that federal special education regulations are vague and
difficult for educators to comprehend, thereby creating
difficulty implementing them.
Greenwood's thesis that IDEA-B may create undue
financial burden on schools is not the subject of my criticism;
rather, it is the logic and documentation upon which his thesis
depends. I will address each of the above points and indicate
why, in my view, they are inadequately supported.

11.
The 1990 Amendments made an important shift in terminology, deleting all
statutory references to "handicap" and substituting the term "disability." Advocates
for students with disabilities had argued that the term disability was less
stigmatizing than handicap. Moreover they successfully argued that the adjective
form of the term disability (i.e., disabled) should not be used to characterize special
education students. Therefore, the statute refers to "children with disabilities," not
to disabled children, reflecting the view that persons with disabilities are ordinary
persons first, whose disability is secondary to their personhood. The field of special
education has adopted the statutory terminology.
12.
20 U.S.C. § 1415; 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.500-514.

170]

COMMENT: CONGRESS' NEW IDEA

173

A. Burdens on Teachers
Greenwood mistakenly asserts that in 1990 IDEA-B
broadened "the scope of disabilities to include, among others,
children with serious emotional disturbance, traumatic brain
injury, and specific learning disabilities" (p. 59). Greenwood
apparently is unaware that from its inception in 1975, IDEA-B
included as eligible disabilities both specific learning
disabilities and serious emotional disturbances-the first and
fourth largest categories of eligible students. 13 And the 1990
addition of traumatic brain injury as a discrete disability
category is not likely to increase teachers' workloads
substantially. Instead it brings political visibility to brain
injured students with learning problems who had previously
been eligible for services under the label of "Specific Learning
Disability." 14
Additionally, Greenwood imprecisely concludes that
"elusive conditions such as attention deficit disorder,
hyperactivity, and impulsivity" are also newly covered
disabilities under the category of "Other Health Impaired" (p.
59). This statement reveals a misunderstanding of the debate
over whether to extend coverage to students with Attention
Deficit Disorder and Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder
(ADD/ADHD). First of all, hyperactivity and impulsivity are
not conditions that alone make one eligible as a student with a
health impairment. Instead they are merely components of

13.
Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) § 4(a) added specific learning
disabilities to Section 602 of the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA) (defining
children with disabilities). Serious emotional disturbance had been included in the
original EHA, Pub. L. No. 91-230, Sec. 602, 84 Stat. 175 (1970). The Twelfth
Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the EHA (1990, p. A-50)
estimated that !i percent of school-age students were served as learning disabled
during the 1988-89 school year, and 1 percent of students as seriously emotionally
disturbed.
14.
34 C.F.R. §300.5(9) (1984). Greenwood did not address the problem of
identifying and serving students with traumatic brain injuries. Although these
children could be served in the past as learning disabled, advocates asserted that
the numbers of students with TBI had increased to the point that their erratic,
puzzling, and unpredictable neurological behaviors demanded recognition as a
separate category. To the extent that schools can less easily ignore the very real
and unusual needs of children with TBI, they may identify more of them than
before. Whether, or by how much, the numbers will escalate remains to be seen.
Autism was the other disability given separate status in the 1990 Amendments.
The workload implications are negligible because students with autism had been
served for years under the category of "Other Health Impaired." See 34 C.F.R. §
330.5(7) (1984).
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ADHD, as is distractibility. 15 Second, ADD/ADHD was
specifically excluded as a new disability category in the 1990
Amendments. In a memo explaining the denial of coverage,
federal officials noted that students with ADD/ADHD could be
eligible for IDEA-B coverage if, in addition to ADD, they had a
covered disability such as a learning disability, or a health
impairment that produced a severe enough reduction in
alertness so as to require special education services. 16 Such a
determination would have to be made on a case by case basis.
Although it is possible that IDEA-B coverage may be extended
to some previously excluded ADD/ADHD students as a result of
the federal memo, it is more likely that regular education
classrooms will be expected to make the necessary
modifications to meet the educational needs of these students.
In any event, the cap of 12% on the number of students toward
whose excess costs the federal government will contribute has
remained the same since 1975. 17
Greenwood notes the serious shortage of special education
teachers in this country and the stretched public school
budgets. These are realities that have plagued special
education for years. The refusal to create a new category of
ADD/ADHD students to be served under IDEA-B was, in part,
a response to this reality. The problem is serious but more a
reflection of the failure to allocate resources to education than
of recent federal expansion of eligibility categories. Greenwood's
argument that the 1990 Amendments increased the number of
disabled children, thereby increasing teacher workloads and
"aggravating deficiencies" (p. 59) is a flawed one.
Greenwood accurately notes the technical nature of
government regulations. The suggestion, however, that the
federal regulations implementing IDEA-B are inaccessible and
largely incomprehensible to teachers and administrators (p. 60)
is an overstatement. The federal regulations have been in place
since 1977, with occasional revisions since. Each state's special
education rules must parallel and reflect the federal
regulations, and special education administrators are required
to be thoroughly grounded in the state rules. Furthermore,

15.
See, e.g., Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III-R),
1987. Basically, ADD simply refers to the presence of various symptoms of
distractibility (inattentiveness) and impulsivity without hyperactivity. ADHD adds
the hyperactivity symptoms.
16.
18 IDELR 116 (OSERS, OSEP, OCR 1991).
See 20 U.S.C. § 1411(a)(5)(A).
17.
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every special education teacher should either possess or have
ready access to a personal copy of the state rules, even if they
do not have a personal copy of the federal regulations. Access
should not be an issue. As for their "legalese" (p. 60) (a problem
common to all federal regulations), the reformatting of the
regulations in the state rules does much to facilitate their
readability. In my experience, to the extent that special
educators do not understand their basic legal obligations under
state and federal law, it is usually a failure of pre-service and
in-service training rather than the "legalese" of the rules.
To illustrate his belief that the regulations are difficult to
interpret, Greenwood quotes the definition of serious emotional
disturbance (SED), and then inexplicably equates ADD with
SED (p. 61). The two are not and have never been synonymous.
Attention deficit disorder, as already mentioned, has its own
set of characteristics and is not even a special education
disability, while serious emotional disturbance is a long
standing one. Greenwood accurately notes the difficulty
distinguishing social maladjustment from some of the
characteristics of what he calls ADD but what is in actuality
serious emotional disturbance. He complains that the "average
teacher cannot reasonably be expected to discriminate among
her students so as to make any sure determination of disability
without the aid of a trained professional" (p. 61). This latter
statement is correct, but it is not clear why he complains about
it. It would be inappropriate and improper for a regular
educator to decide alone that a student has a disability. The
implications of disability status are serious for the student,
involving potential stigma and treatment that in many
instances isolates the student from peers. Classification as
disabled should be made ONLY with the aid of trained
personnel. And although at times it is difficult for trained
personnel to be certain whether a student is socially
maladjusted rather than seriously emotionally disturbed,
Greenwood's conclusion that professional determinations may
be "ad hoc, given the over-inclusive and vague definitions [of
serious emotional disturbance]" (p. 62) is speculative. Given the
exclusion of ADD and social maladjustment from the definition,
it is unclear why the definition is over-inclusive. Furthermore,
his conclusion ignores the extensive requirements for
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multidisciplinary, nondiscriminatory, multi-faceted eligibility
procedures. 18
When Greenwood discusses the IEP, he again
demonstrates his lack of understanding of IDEA-B. His most
serious error is to state that "all discussions and suggestions
among professional educators and administrators regarding the
child, along with parent-teacher conferences or other formal
and informal proceedings, must be recorded in the IEP'' (p. 62).
The implication is that the IEP is an unwieldy and bulky
record of numerous meetings. Instead, it is a short document
developed at an IEP meeting. It includes the student's current
levels of performance, annual goals and objectives, amount of
regular and special education and related support services, and
criteria for measuring progress toward the attainment of the
specified objectives. In Utah, for instance, most IEPs are one to
two pages in length. Although proper development of an IEP
can take time, the process at its best brings the key players
(parents, teachers, support personnel, sometimes the student)
together to design a program that meets the unique needs of a
given student.
Although the high expectations of IDEA-B, coupled with
relatively modest federal financial support for state and local
funding efforts, make it vulnerable to legitimate criticism,
Greenwood's criticisms are not well bolstered. His inaccuracies
do not help him make his case that the burdens on teachers
are increasing.
B. Administrative Hearing Costs
When a conflict arises between the home and the school
over the identification, evaluation, placement, or provision of a
free appropriate public education, either the school or the
parent may seek resolution of the conflict at an impartial,
administrative hearing. 19 Greenwood does not inform the
reader that the hearing mechanism was inserted in the statute
to avoid the need for long, drawn-out litigation. Congress hoped
that it would save money and emotional trauma for all
concerned. Nonetheless, Greenwood is quite correct in pointing
out that most of the costs of these hearings must be paid for by
education agencies. In fact, their usefulness has not met

18.
19.

See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.530-542.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(E) & (b)(2); 34 C.F.R. §300.506.
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original expectations, and their costs-in time, money, and
emotional strain-have proved to be a significant burden to
both parties to the dispute. 20

C. Remedies for Noncompliance with IDEA-B
Greenwood is careless in referring to the remedies for
noncompliance with IDEA-B as "damage" remedies (pages 50,
66, 71, 72, 73), while elsewhere (p. 64) referring to the
remedies as "the practical equivalent" of damages. As of yet, no
compensatory damages for pain and suffering have been
awarded under the statute. As Greenwood observes, where an
education agency has failed to provide a free appropriate public
education, the courts have awarded two types of relief that
bring increased financial burdens for the education agency: (1)
tuition reimbursement for parents who have withdrawn their
children from inappropriate programs and placed them
properly in private school, and (2) compensatory education
(usually education extending past the mandatory school age)
for children whose parents did not withdraw them from public
school but who were denied appropriate education for
significant periods of time. Although these remedies do indeed
result in financial cost to the districts, the courts typically are
careful to distinguish them from "damage awards" and to
characterize them instead as a means of requiring an education
agency to provide the instruction it should have been providing
all along. In fact, the courts make a point of stating that they
are not awarding "damages" for the school's omissions. 21
Earlier in the article Greenwood describes as remedies
"injunctions such as a stay of educational placement during
administrative proceedings, or a reimbursement of private
tuition while the proceedings are pending'' (p. 58). Both
examples mislead the reader. First, although injunctions

20.
See, e.g., Steven S. Goldberg, The Failure of Legalization in Education:
Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Education for all Handicapped Children Act
of 1975, 18 JOURNAL OF LAW AND EDUCATION 441 (1989).
See, e.g., Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Massachusetts Dept. of Educ., 471 U.S.
21.
359, 370-71 (1985) (tuition reimbursement is not "damages" but "merely requires
the Town to belatedly pay expenses that it should have paid all along and would
have borne in the first instance had it developed a proper IEP"). See also
Waterman v. Marquette-Alger lntermed. School Dist., 739 F. Supp. 361 (W.D. Mich.
1990) (monetary damages not recoverable under EHA); Puffer v. Raynolds, 761 F.
Supp. 838, 853 (D.Mass. 1988) (request for monetary damages denied; remedial
education instead will correct any damage done).
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against the school district are indeed a common form of relief, a
"stay of educational placement" is not an injunction. What
Greenwood is referring to is the fact that IDEA-B includes a socalled "stay-put provision," requiring a child to remain in the
current educational placement pending the outcome of
administrative proceedings. 22 An injunction is not necessary to
invoke the stay-put provision. In fact, the opposite is true; the
stay-put provision applies UNLESS a school district can get an
injunction to remove a student from the current placement
without the need for parental permission or an administrative
hearing decision. 23 Second, reimbursement is not available
while proceedings are pending. Greenwood is alluding to the
fact that, although the stay-put provision applies to school
districts, it does not prevent parents from placing their child
unilaterally in a private placement pending the outcome of the
proceedings. The parents, however, do not have a right to
reimbursement "while the proceedings are pending"; rather
parents may be reimbursed only if the OUTCOME of the
proceedings is a determination that the education agency was
denying the student a free, appropriate public education and
the parental placement was proper. 24

D. Attorneys' Fee Awards
Greenwood is not alone in his concern about the 1986
Amendment to IDEA-B making reasonable attorneys' fees
available to parents who prevail in administrative hearings or
in court; other critics have questioned the wisdom of allowing
prevailing parents to be reimbursed by school districts for their
attorneys' fees. His language is inflammatory, however,
because he concludes-without adequate documentation-that
courts can make an education agency pay for trivial, "de
minimis" results favoring the parent and for an "inadvertent
procedural flaw or delay" (p. 67). The U.S. Supreme Court
standard for determining that a party has prevailed is that a
significant or material change in the party's legal status is a
result of the proceeding, 25 not exactly a "de minimis" result.

22.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3).
23.
See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988).
24.
Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Massachusetts Dept. of Educ., 471 U.S. 359
(1985).
See, e.g., Te.xas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland lndep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S.
25.
782, 793 (1989). See also, Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 440 (1983) ("where
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And after more than fifteen years' experience with the statute,
education agencies are not in a good position to reasonably
argue that their procedural flaws or delays are inadvertent. 26

E. Abrogation of State Immunity
Of special concern to Greenwood is the fact that the 1990
Amendments clarified that IDEA abrogates state immunity
from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. He asserts,
imprecisely, that "the Eleventh Amendment has long prevented
suits against states for money damages where such awards
were to be paid from public funds in the treasury" (p. 68). In
actuality, the Eleventh Amendment prevents suits IN FEDERAL
COURT against states but has never prevented such suits in
state court. 27 Perhaps his misstatement is simply careless,
because in other parts of his article, he appears to acknowledge
the correct standard; in any event, his imprecision creates a
problem for the reader.
Similarly, Greenwood errs in stating that Dellmuth v.
Muth evidences that the Supreme Court "did not believe
Congress intended to grant an enforceable right to education to
children with handicaps ... " (p. 69). It is absolutely clear
under the initial version of IDEA-B in 1975 and all its
amended versions that Congress granted an enforceable private
right of action to children with disabilities. 28 For fifteen years,
aggrieved students have been suing education agencies in both
state and federal court for violation of the statute. What was

the plaintiff achieved only limited success, the district court should award only
that amount of fees that is reasonable in relation to the results obtained").
26.
Moreover, courts in general distinguish between harmless procedural errors
that do not deprive students of significant rights (e.g. oral notice of desired
changes in IEP instead of written notice), and serious procedural errors (failure to
notify parents of their legal rights, failure to involve them in the development of
the IEP) that have the effect of denying their child the right to a free appropriate
public education. Only the latter will affect the outcome of the case and the
determination of whether the parent was a prevailing party.
27.
The text of the Eleventh Amendment states: "The judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another
State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state." For over a hundred years,
the Amendment has been construed judicially to also preclude suit in federal court
against a state by citizens of that same state. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1
(1890).
28.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) has continuously provided that "any party aggrieved
by the findings and decision [of the final administrative hearing] shall have the
right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint presented . . . ."
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not clear at first was whether the remedies extended to
financial awards (in contrast to injunctions and declaratory
relief). The answer with respect to local education agencies was
settled in the affirmative by the Supreme Court's decision in
Burlington School Committee u. Massachusetts Department of
Education. 29 Several years later, the Supreme Court in
Dellmuth u. Muth 30 concluded that, absent an unequivocal
pronouncement in the text of IDEA that state education
agencies accepting federal money under IDEA-B waived their
immunity from suit in federal court, state immunity was not
waived. The decision had no applicability to local education
agencies. Fast on the heels of this decision, Congress explicitly
established its unequivocal intent to waive state immunity. 31
The primary rationale for abrogating immunity is found in
older IDEA-B language charging the state education agency
with the responsibility for assuring that other governmental
agencies meet their obligations under the statute;32 in other
words, the state education agency is the entity intended to be
held accountable when a local school district defaults. Another
situation leading to a need to sue the state is when a stateoperated program, such as a state school for the deaf, itself is
allegedly denying appropriate special education services to a
student. The number of local and intermediate education
agencies defaulting on their financial obligations under IDEA-B
has not been high to date, and suits for financial awards
against ANY education agency, whether state or local, constitute
a minority of suits against education agencies under IDEAB.aa

Finally, Greenwood asserts that abrogation of state
immunity may have the effect of making each state's immunity
statute "determinative of a state agency's liability under the

29.
471 U.S. 359 (1985).
30.
491 u.s. 223 (1989).
31.
20 U.S.C. § 1403(a)-(b).
32.
20 U.S.C. §1412(6); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d).
33.
Suits for or against various changes in evaluation, placement, and
programming constitute a larger group of cases. Of course, decisions in these kinds
of disputes also can have significant financial implications, e.g., the cost of
expensive related services needed to enable a student to benefit from special
education. The most expensive related service is the cost of the non-medical care
(including board and room) in a residential facility, in the rare situation when a
student needs such a facility to receive a free appropriate public education. See
Dixie S. Huefner, Special Education Residential Placements under the Education {or
All Handicapped Children Act, 18 JOURNAL OF LAW AND EDUCATION 411
(1989).
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IDEA" (p. 70). This is an erroneous conclusion and one that
contradicts his own recognition on the previous page that
federal law is supreme over conflicting state law. The 1990
IDEA-B amendment abrogating state immunity from suit in
federal court also states (and Greenwood quotes it on p. 69)
that remedies against a state are available "to the same extent
as such remedies are available . . . against any public entity
other than a State."34 In effect, this provision abrogates state
sovereign immunity statutes, making them irrelevant in either
federal or state court, since state courts must enforce the
provisions of overriding federal law.
Ill. CONCLUSION

The dominant question Greenwood intended to raise
appears to be whether the costs of tuition reimbursement,
compensatory education, administrative hearings, and
attorneys' fees are so disproportionate to the benefits achieved
as to deserve a radical rethinking. Although many school
districts insure themselves against the costs of the parents'
attorney's fees, hearing costs and financial awards typically
must be paid for out of special education budgets and in a
sense are "robbing from Peter to pay Paul." Greenwood's
question is a legitimate one. Without a great deal of empirical
data, however, we are not in a position to ascertain whether
the hearing costs and the investment in the small numbers of
students receiving compensatory education and tuition
reimbursements are helping or harming special education (and,
by extension, regular education) in the long run. Among
questions that deserve to be investigated but are not addressed
in Greenwood's article are the following:
1. How many awards of compensatory education and
tuition reimbursement have been made since 1978 (when
IDEA-B standards became enforceable in court) against local
school districts? Against state education agencies? What
percent of the special education population does this represent?
2. What has been the actual financial cost to education
agencies of these awards? What services to other special
education students have been cut as a result of these costs?
3. Is there evidence that awards of compensatory education
and tuition reimbursement have declined with time in the

34.

20

u.s.c.

§1403(b).
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affected school districts? In other words, is there evidence that
these remedies may be having the beneficial effect of reducing
the extent of a school district's noncompliance with IDEA-B?
4. What is the cost to education agencies of awarding
attorneys' fees? Will insurance companies continue to protect
education agencies against this kind of liability?
5. What percent of the special education population seeks
an administrative hearing in any given year? Does the hearing
save money in the long run if it assures that special education
students receive an appropriate education that will increase
their self-sufficiency and independence after they leave school?
In other words, is it a cost-effective investment for society?
6. Would a cap on the amount of reimbursement that
education agencies could pay for court-approved private
placements better balance the needs of all special education
students?
7. Are there data suggesting that regular education is
being harmed by the relief being awarded by courts to ensure
that education agencies comply with IDEA-B?
Greenwood reveals his conclusion in his introduction when
he states that federal legislation "directs exceptional attention
to a single class of children at the expense of the majority" (p.
50). He reiterates that viewpoint in his final sentence. Neither
his scholarship, his understanding of school finance, nor his
representation of the federal special education statute creates
confidence in his conclusion. Although there is genuine reason
for concern about the financial costs of noncompliance with
IDEA-B, the Greenwood article does not contribute to our
understanding of whether the costs are excessive or of who may
be more hurt by these costs-special education students or
regular education students.

